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DOUBLE JEOPARDY: A PROTECTION OR AN EMPTY PROMISE?
Waller v. State, 270 So. 2d 26 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972)
Appellant, Joseph Wailer, removed an "offensive" mural' from the St.
Petersburg, Florida, City Hall during a 1966 civil rights demonstration.2 He
was convicted in municipal court of violating two city ordinances, governing
destruction of city property 3 and disorderly breach of the peace. 4 Subsequently,
he was tried and convicted of grand larceny by the state. 5 On appeal, the
Second District Court of Appeal held that double jeopardy would not bar
prosecutions for the same offense by two separate sovereigns, the municipality
and the state.6 The United States Supreme Court, on certiorari, reversed the
decision of the district court, holding that state and municipal governments
are not separate sovereigns 7 and that the defendant was placed in double
jeopardy when he was tried for the same offense in state and municipal courts.8
On remand, the trial court retried and reconvicted Waller on the grand larceny charge.9 The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and
HELD, the municipal charges of breach of the peace and malicious destruction
of city property are not lesser included offenses of grand larceny and, therefore,
double jeopardy did not apply. 10
One of the fundamental civil liberties inherited from the common law is

I. Appellant alleged that the mural was offensive in that it "depicted Negroes grotesquely." Brief for Appellant at 2, 28, Waller v. State, 208 So. 2d 147 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
2. The district court described Waller as a "zealous civil rights activist obviously overwrought in the fervor of his cause." 270 So. 2d 26 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
3. ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE §25.14 (1963).
4. Id. §25.15 (1963).
5. Fla. Stat. §811.021 (1967) provided in part: "(I) A person who, with intent to deprive
or defraud the true owner of his property or of the use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate
the same to the use of the taker, or of any other person: (a) Takes from the possession of
the true owner ... (d) .. .steals such property, and is guilty of larceny. (2) If the property
stolen is of the value of one hundred dollars or more, the offender shall be deemed guilty
of grand larceny ...."
6. 213 So. 2d 623 (2d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 221 So. 2d 749 (1968). Finding it unnecessary to consider the defendant's claim that the municipal ordinance violation of destruction of city property was a lesser included offense of grand larceny, the court said:
"Assuming but not holding that the violations of the municipal ordinances were included
offenses of the crime of grand larceny, the appellant nevertheless has not twice been put in
jeopardy, because even if a person has been tried in a municipal court for the identical
offense with which he is charged in a state court, this would not be a bar to the prosecution
of such person in the proper state court." Id. at 624.
7. State and local governments derive their authority from a single organic source - the
Florida constitution -and, therefore, are of the same sovereignty. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S.
387, 392 (1970).
8. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970). The Supreme Court based its decision on the
assumption of the district court that the municipal violations were lesser included offenses
of grand larceny. See note 6 supra.
9. The trial court determined that the municipal violations were not lesser included
offenses of grand larceny and that the state could retry Waller for grand larceny.
10. 270 So. 2d 26 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
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the guarantee against double jeopardy., The right of a citizen not to be prosecuted more than once for the "same offense" is established by the constitutions
of both the United States12 and Florida. 3 These provisions protect a defendant
from repeated prosecutions for a single offense 4 and have been extended to
include prosecutions for similar offenses.1 5 Although the right may be stated
simply, courts have often found the double jeopardy guarantee difficult to
apply in cases involving similar offenses.:6
A single criminal act or omission, committed by one individual, can give
rise to several similar offenses, triable within one or more federal, state, and
local jurisdictions." The courts have struggled for over two centuries to develop tests that will indicate when double jeopardy attaches in separate trials
for similar offenses. In applying these tests the courts tend to categorize similar
offenses into two groups: "related" offenses and "unrelated" offenses.' 8 Related
offenses are governed by the "lesser included tests,"' 9 while unrelated offenses
are governed by the "same evidence"20 and "same transaction" 2' tests. 22 The
court in the instant case deals exclusively with the lesser included offense
2

tests. 3
The Florida supreme court in Brown v. State24 set forth the lesser included
tests for related offenses: A lesser offense may either "necessarily" be included

11. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1968).
12. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
FLA.
13. "No person shall be . . . twice put in jeopardy for the same offense .....
CONsT. art. I, §9.
14. See generally Haddad & Mulock, Double Jeopardy Problems in the Definition of
Same Offense: State Discretion To Invoke the Criminal Process Twice, 22 U. FL.A L. REv.
515 (1970).
15. Id. at 526.
16. See, e.g., Sanford v. State, 75 Fla. 393, 78 So. 340 (1918); Burnett v. Commonwealth,
284 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1955).
17. E.g., State v. Bowden, 154 Fla. 511, 18 So. 2d 478 (1944) (where unlawful intercourse
with a girl under 18 led to prosecutions for rape and for unlawful intercourse with an unmarried female person of previous chaste character under the age of 18 - two offenses); King
v. State, 145 Fla. 286, 199 So. 38 (1940) (where the defendant was being tried for aiding and
abetting an arson with the intent to defraud an insurer, following a prosecution for aiding
and abetting arson - both offenses arising out of the setting of a single fire).
18. "Unrelated" offenses are similar offenses that are committed concurrently, no one
offense being a degree of another or included in another 1"related" offenses). See Haddad &
Mulock, supra note 14, at 526.
19. The lesser included tests comprehend degrees of a single offense as well as offenses
related due to similarity in substance. Id. at 533.
20. Double jeopardy will attach under this test when the same evidence is used to prove
two different offenses at separate trials. Note, Double Jeopardy-Municipal Prosecutions as
a Bar to Subsequent State Prosecutions for Offenses Arising from the Same Criminal Actions,
76 DicK. L. REv. 282, 287 (1972).
21. Under this test all offenses arising out of a single criminal episode must be tried in
one trial. Id. at 289.
22. See note 14 supra.
23. 270 So. 2d 26, 28 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
24. 206 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1968).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss4/13

2

Shuford: Double Jeopardy: A Protection or an Empty Promise?

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

in the greater offense or it "may or may not" be included. 25 If the lesser crime
is an essential link in the chain of evidence leading to the greater crime, it is
necessarily included. In other words, the state must prove the commission of
the lesser crime to meet its burden of proof on the greater. 2 Alternatively, a
lesser offense "may or may not" be included in another offense, depending on
the wording of the accusatorial pleading and the evidence presented at trial.2If the information alleges all the elements of a lesser offense, and evidence at
28
trial supports the allegations, the lesser offense is included in the greater. If
an offense is lesser included, both it and the greater offense must be charged in
a single information and be disposed of in a single trial.29.
In the instant case the appellant argued that malicious destruction of city
property was a lesser included offense of grand larceny.30 Contending that the
state's general larceny allegation contemplated the offense of malicious destruction, he asserted that the charge and the supporting evidence rendered the
ordinance lesser included under the "may or may not" test. 3 1 The state argued,
however, that malicious destruction of city property must have been specifically
alleged in the information on grand larceny for the "may or may not" test of

25. Id. In Brown the court held that the defendant, on trial for robbery, was entitled
to have a jury instruction on larceny because that offense was "necessarily" included in the
crime of robbery. The court's discussion of the "may or may not" test constituted dictum.
Note that once it is determined under either test that a defendant is entitled to a jury
instruction on the lesser offense, jeopardy attaches in that trial. See supra note 14, at 534-38.
26. "For example, in order to prove a robbery, the state must necessarily prove a larceny
as an essential element of the major offense." Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377, 382 (Fla. 1968).
27. Id. at 384.
28. For example, if the information charged "assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to commit robbery," then aggravated assault (assault with a deadly weapon), if supported
by the evidence at trial, would be a lesser included offense. Id. at 384. At this stage it should
be pointed out that the Brown lesser included tests appear to be no less protective of the
rights of the accused than the federal lesser included tests. Tie federal courts apply the
necessarily included test and a same evidence test to determine lesser included offenses. See,
e.g., Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Ex parte Nielson, 131 U.S. 176 (1888);
Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Giles v. United States, 157 F.2d
588 (9th Cir. 1946); Gray v. United States, 14 F.2d 366 (8th Cir. 1926).
29. A defendant may not be convicted or acquitted of a greater offense in one trial and
later be tried for a lesser offense in another trial; nor can the defendant be tried for the
lesser offense and later be tried for the greater. Sanford v. State, 75 Fla. 393, 78 So. 340 (Fla.
1918) (former conviction of assault and battery, a necessarily lesser included offense, barred
a prosecution for rape and subsequent conviction of assault with the intent to commit rape,
a greater offense); accord, Southworth v. State, 98 Fla. 1184, 125 So. 345 (1929) (dictum).
30. Brief for Appellant at 14, Waller v. State, 270 So. 2d 26 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972). The
court said neither of the municipal ordinances were lesser included offenses of grand larceny.
However, appellant had argued only that the offense of destruction of city property was
lesser included.
31. Brief for Appellant at 15, 16, Waller v. State, 270 So. 2d 26 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
Despite the fact appellant had not argued that malicious destruction of city property was
necessarily included, the Second District Court of Appeal in the opening sentence of its
opinion said: "This case boils down in its last analysis to a single simple issue, namely,
whether an infraction of a local municipal vandalism ordinance is a necessarily-included
offense within the State felony offense of grand larceny." 270 So. 2d 26 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
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Brown to be met.3 2 Despite the fact the parties were raising a double jeopardy
33
issue not yet answered in this state, the court summarily disposed of the case.
Rather than clarifying the "may or may not" test in terms of what must be
alleged in the information, s the opinion is devoted to a reiteration and justifi3 5
cation of the court's earlier Waller decision.
The underlying purpose of the lesser included tests, as established in
Brown, is to enable "the state to have adjudicated in one trial all aspects of a
criminal charge arising out of one transaction" and to protect the "defendant
against a splitting of accusations with resultant multitudinous prosecutions
and trials."3 6 The summary dismissal of Waller's double jeopardy plea evidences the inherent difficulties with the lesser included tests for double
37
jeopardy as they exist today.
The instant court concluded that, since the municipal ordinance violation
and grand larceny were not related crimes, the lesser included tests would not
bar separate trials. Nevertheless, the court might still have held that separate
trials for these offenses subjected appellant to double jeopardy. Separate trials
for "unrelated" offenses can constitute double jeopardy if the "same evidence"
is used in each of the two trials to prove the offenses.38 The same evidence test
is well established in Florida 9 and is followed by a majority of the states. 40

32. Brief for Appellee at 8, Waller v. State, 270 So. 2d 26 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
33. "It seems to us that the determining ingredient of this case at this time is whether
or not the municipal court charges of breach of the peace and malicious destruction of city
property were lesser and included offenses of the State charge of grand larceny. We hold
that they definitely were not such included offenses and that no legal impediment prevents
the prosecution of Waller on the State charge." 270 So. 2d 26, 28 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
34. The Florida supreme court, in a decision rendered subsequent to the district court's
opinion in the instant case, addressed itself to this problem and reaffirmed Brown, holding
that all of the elements of the lesser offense must be spelled out in the accusatory pleading.
Anderson v. State, 270 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1972). No court in Florida, however, has of yet
reconciled the "may or may not" test with Fla. Stat. §811.021(5) (1969), which allows larceny
to be alleged generally, rather than requiring that the specific elements of the crime be
alleged (as is the case with most other crimes). This question was open for determination by
the court in the instant case. See Brief for Appellant at 15, Waller v. State, 270 So. 2d 26 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
35. Appellant had argued that the United States Supreme Court did not intend for the
state to retry the defendant on the grand larceny charge. Brief for Appellant at 10, Waller
v. State, 270 So. 2d 26 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972). However, it seems certain from the Supreme
Court's opinion that its holding was restricted to the separate sovereign issue. Waller v.
Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 395 (1970). The Supreme Court assumed, arguendo, as had the Florida
district court, that the municipal ordinance violations were lesser included. See note 8 supra.
The court in the instant case apologized for its "unfortunate and improvident" language of
"assuming but not holding, etc.," used in its earlier opinion. 270 So. 2d 26, 28 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1972).
36. Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377, 382-83 (Fla. 1968).
37. "The criminal law of this state regarding lesser included offenses has been the
subject of much judicial uncertainty, resulting in vague appellate opinions reaching different
conclusions on identical facts." Anderson v. State, 270 So. 2d 353, 357 (Fla. 1972).
38. Haddad & Mulock, supra note 14.
39. See, e.g., McHugh v. State, 36 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1948); State v. Bacom, 159 Fla. 54, 30
So. 2d 744 (1947), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 910 (1953); State v. Bowden, 154 Fla. 511, 18 So. 2d
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This test should have been applied in the instant case.
It is not certain, however, what the outcome would have been had the
same evidence test been applied. If different evidence is used at each trial,
double jeopardy will not attach. 43 Although Florida courts have stated that
42
minor (non-material) evidentiary differences will not justify separate trials,
the elusiveness of the concept of materiality may result in a defendant losing a
double jeopardy plea merely because a judge believes he should be retried
for another offense. In the instant case, for example, the court might find that
proof of the value of the mural - necessary to establish grand larceny - is a
material evidentiary difference, and thus conclude that it would not be double
jeopardy for the state to try Waller for grand larceny.
The inherent difficulties with the lesser included offense and same evidence
tests point out the need for adoption of a new standard to identify double
jeopardy. Although no decision of the United States Supreme Court compels
adoption of any one of these approaches to double jeopardy, 43 Mr. Justice
Brennan in his concurring opinion in Waller v. Florida44 and Ashe v. Swenson 45 advocates the adoption of a "same transaction" or "same criminal episode" test: The state would be compelled, except in a few extraordinary instances, 46 to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant arising out of
a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction. 4 7 Not only would the
other tests not be needed, but the same transaction test would be more consistent with the underlying purpose of the double jeopardy prohibition - to
protect a defendant against multiple prosecutions undertaken by a zealous
prosecutor. 48 Abuses 49 inherent in the lesser included and same evidence tests

478 (1944); King v. State, 145 Fla. 286, 199 So. 38 (1940); Albritton v. State, 137 Fla. 20, 187
So. 601 (1939).
40. Note, Double Jeopardy and the Concept of Identity of Offenses, 7 BROOKLYN L. REv.
79, 81 (1937). See, e.g., Baldwin v. State, 47 Ala. App. 136, 251 So. 2d 633 (Crim. App. 1971);
State v. Stout, 5 Ariz. App. 271, 425 P.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1967); Davidson v. People, 64 Colo.
281, 170 P. 962 (1918); State v. Williams, 6 Storey 112, 184 A.2d 618 (Del. 1962); Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923); State v. Roberts, 152 La. 283, 93 So. 95
(1922); Commonwealth v. Butterick, 100 Mass. 1, 97 Am. Dec. 65 (1868); State v. Overman.
269 N.C. 453, 153 S.E.2d 44 (1967); Dodge v. State, 124 Ohio St. 580, 180 N.E. 45 (1932).
41. McHugh v. State, 36 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1948).
42. Faulkner v. State, 146 Fla. 769, 1 So. 2d 857 (1941).
43. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 468 (1958). See also Abbate v. United States, 559
U.S. 187, 198 (1958); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); Cuicci v. Illinois, 356 U.S.
571 (1958); United States v. Adams, 281 U.S. 202 (1930); Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1888).
44. 397 U.S. 387, 396 (1970).
45. 397 U.S. 436, 448 (1970).
46. For example, if an offense arising out of one transaction is not discovered, despite
due diligence by the police, until after a prosecution on another offense arising out of the
transaction, or if no single court has jurisdiction over all the crimes, multiple prosecutions
would be appropriate. Id. at 453. See, e.g., Southworth v. State, 98 Fla. 1184, 125 So. 345
(1929).
47. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453 (1970).
48. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
49. E.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923) (each of 75 poker
hands was held to be a separate offense under the same evidence test).
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can be avoided with the same transaction test, and the double jeopardy prohibition would not be an empty promise.
It has been predicted the United States Supreme Court will incorporate
the same transaction test into the double jeopardy clause in the near future.50
Modern legal authorities, including the American Law Institute, have expressed their preference for the same transaction test.51 English courts have
held it to be more protective of the double jeopardy right, abandoning rules
against joinder of charges in favor of the same transaction test.52 Finally, the
Supreme Court appears to have forecast in its Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the adoption of the test.53 These rules liberally encourage the joining of
parties and charges in a single trial. 54
Florida could adopt the same transaction test on its own initiative, some
support for it having recently been expressed. 55 The First District Court of
Appeal in Eagle v. State,55 while not specifically holding on this issue, said
that "absent compelling reasons" trial courts should insist that where several
indictments are filed against a defendant constituting separate offenses growing out of the same transaction or occurrence, such indictments be consolidated and disposed of in one trialy7 Adoption of the same transaction test
would relieve the defendant of the agony and expense of repeated prosecutions. The intent of the Double Jeopardy Clause, as stated by the United
States Supreme Court in Green v. United States, would be realized: 5"
[That] the state with all its resources and power should not be allowed
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity

50.

Comment, Criminal justice: Double Jeopardy-Abolition

of the Dual Sovereignty

Theory of City-State Prosecutions,31 LA. L. REv. 540, 547 (1971). Foundation for this prediction is not lacking as Justices Douglas and Marshall support Mr. Justice Brennan's position
on this issue. If the Supreme Court did incorporate the same transaction test into the Constitution, it would have to be followed by the Florida courts. The double jeopardy provision
(and the principles incorporated into it by the court) has been applied to the states via the
fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 392 U.S. 925 (1968).
51. Compare ALl ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, OFFICIAL DRAFT: DOUBLE
JEOPARDY §5 (1935) (used the same evidence test), with ALl MODEL PENAL CODE, PROPOSED
OFFICIAL DRAFrT §§1.07(2), 1.09(l)(b) (1962). Also, ABA STANDARDS: JOINDER AND SEVERANCE

§§1.1, 1.3 (Approved Draft, 1968) provide for joinder, on motion by the defendant, of
similar offenses that "are based upon the same conduct or arise from the same criminal
episode."
52. See Connelly v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1964] A.C. 1254.
53. FED. R. CRIr. P. 8(a). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 13.
54. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 455 (1970).
55. See State v. Stiefel, 256 So. 2d 581, 583 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
56. 249 So. 2d 460 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
57. Id. at 465.
58. 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
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